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Abstract
The research on coalitional games has focused on how to
share the reward among a coalition such that players are in-
centivised to collaborate together. It assumes that the (de-
terministic or stochastic) characteristic function is known in
advance. This paper studies a new setting (a task allocation
problem) where the characteristic function is not known and
it is controlled by some private information from the players.
Hence, the challenge here is twofold: (i) incentivize players
to reveal their private information truthfully, (ii) incentivize
them to collaborate together. We show that existing reward
distribution mechanisms or auctions cannot solve the chal-
lenge. Hence, we propose the very first mechanism for the
problem from the perspective of both mechanism design and
coalitional games.
Introduction
Cooperative games have been used to model competitions
between groups/coalitions of players (Davis and Maschler
1965). A cooperative game is defined by specifying a value
for each coalition and it studies which coalitions will form
and how they share the payoffs to enforce the collabora-
tion. The value for each coalition represents the reward they
can achieve together, e.g., finishing a task or building a so-
cial good. This value (the characteristic function) is often
predefined and public, which can be either deterministic
or stochastic. However, in real-world applications, what a
coalition can achieve may depend on players’ capabilities,
which is not necessarily known to everyone in advance.
In this paper, we study a cooperative game where the char-
acteristic function is controlled by some private information
owned by the coalition. Specifically, we study a task allo-
cation problem, where a group of players collaborate to ac-
complish a sequence of tasks in order and there is a deadline
to finish all the tasks. Because of the deadline, we need to
find the best set of players to do the tasks. Each player’s
capability is modelled by how much time she needs to fin-
ish a task. However, the finishing time is not fixed and it
is a random variable following some distribution, which is
only known to the player. Because of the uncertainty, the
objective is to maximize the probability to meet the dead-
line (Frank 1969). In order to find the best set of players
to meet the objective, we need to first know their private
distributions (which then defines the probability to meet the
deadline for each coalition). That is, the characteristic func-
tion is defined by the private distributions of the players in a
coalition.
We model the problem as a coalitional game, but the value
for each coalition (the characteristic function) is controlled
by the players’ private information, which has never been
investigated in the literature. On one hand, we want each
player to tell their true private information to make the best
decision, and on the other hand, we want the reward to
be fairly distributed among the players. Cooperative games
are often used to take care of the reward/cost distribution
to enforce collaboration, while mechanism design is good
at private information elicitation in a competitive environ-
ment (Nisan et al. 2007). We will show that our challenge
cannot be solved by just using techniques from one side.
Thus, our goal is to design new reward sharing mecha-
nisms such that players are incentivized to report their pri-
vate distributions truthfully and the reward are distributed
fairly among all players. To combat this problem, we pro-
pose a novel mechanism to solve both challenges using the
techniques from both cooperative game theory and mech-
anism design. Our solution is based on a modified Shap-
ley value which distributes the reward according to the
players’ capabilities which incentivizes all players to re-
veal their true capabilities. The cost to achieve the goal
is that the total reward distributed is more than what the
coalition can generate. For comparison, we also studied
a solution from a non-cooperative perspective by using
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Vickrey 1961;
Clarke 1971; Groves 1973). VCG is very good at handling
private information revelation, but the reward distribution is
not as fair as the Shapley value.
Related Work
As closely related work, coalitional games with stochastic
characteristic functions have been a rich line of research ini-
tiated by Charnes and Granot (1976; 1977). They assumed
that the value for each coalition is a random variable fol-
lowing some known/public distributions, so the challenge is
about how to promise a payoff for the grand coalition, such
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that the coalition is still enforceable and it does not over
pay if the random outcome is not good. Their setting does
not formally model where the randomness comes from. In
our model, since each player has a random task completion
time, together, we can say that the total completion time for a
coalition is a random variable controlled by the players. We
focus on how to incentivize the players to reveal their private
random variable. Bachrach et al. (2012) studied the network
reliability problem, where an edge has a probability to fail
for connecting two points in a network, but the probability
is public, which is essentially a special case of (Charnes and
Granot 1976; Charnes and Granot 1977). Their focus is to
compute the Shapley value efficiently.
There are also many other studies on coalitional games
with imcomplete information from different perspectives.
Chalkiadakis and Boutilier (2004; 2012; 2007) took a learn-
ing/bargaining approach to learn the types of the other play-
ers in a repeated game form, while we directly ask them to
report their types. Li and Conitzer (2015) studied the least
core concept in a setting where the characteristic function
has some well-defined noise (random effect), which is not
controlled by any player. Ieong ad Shoham (2008) consid-
ered the game where each player is uncertain about which
game they are playing as a Bayesian game with informa-
tion partition. On top of the stochastic characteristic function
modelled by (Charnes and Granot 1976), Suijs et al. (1999;
1999) extended the setting to the case where each coalition
has some actions to choose and each action leads to a differ-
ent random payoff. Myeson (2007) further considered that
each player has multiple types with some distribution and
each player also knows the type distributions of the others,
then the paper investigated mechanisms with side payments
to incentivize players to reveal their true types. However,
when the players’ types are given, the payoff they can gen-
erate is not stochastic. Our model requires each player to re-
port her private type (which is a distribution) and given their
types, the value they can generate together is also stochastic.
Our solution has also applied type verification for their
task execution time. Nisan and Ronen (2001) studied a task
scheduling problem where each agent first declares a time
she needs to finish a task and later when the task is allocated
and executed, the mechanism is able to verify how much
time the agent actually took. By doing so, the mechanism
can verify what the agent reported and pay the agent ac-
cording to the execution, which is a direct verification of
the agent’s report. In our setting, we cannot directly ver-
ify a player’s time distribution, but we are still able to see
how much time the execution takes, which is a partial veri-
fication of the distribution. This partial verification has been
applied first by Porter et al. (2008) in a single task alloca-
tion where each worker has a (private) probability to fail
the task. Inspired by their solution, different extensions have
been investigated (Ramchurn et al. 2009; Stein et al. 2011;
Conitzer and Vidali 2014; Zhao, Ramchurn, and Jennings
2016). All these settings are studied from a non-cooperative
perspective and mostly for a single task, while our setting
has multiple interdependent tasks and looks at the coopera-
tive perspective.
The Model
We investigate a coalitional game where the characteristic
function is not given in advance. It is defined by the capabil-
ities of the players, and each player’s capability is a private
information of the player. This setting exists in many real-
world task allocation problems.
We consider herein a task allocation problem. The prob-
lem is of a project that consists of a sequence of m different
tasks T = (τ1, · · · , τm) to be finished in order, i.e. τi cannot
be started until all tasks before τi have been finished. There
is a deadline d to finish the entire project. Finishing all tasks
before the deadline generates a value V , and finishing the
tasks after the deadline does not generate any value.
There are n agents (players) denoted by N = {1, · · · , n}
who can perform the tasks with different capabilities. With-
out loss of generality, we assume that each player is only
capable of doing one of the tasks. Let Nτi ⊆ N be the
set of players who can handle task τi. We have Nτi 6= ∅
for all τi ∈ T , Nτi ∩ Nτj = ∅ for all τi 6= τj ∈ T , and∪τi∈TNτi = N .
For each player i ∈ Nτj , her capability to handle task τj
is measured by the execution time she needs to accomplish
τj . We also consider that there is some uncertainty for player
i to accomplish the task. Therefore, player i does not know
the exact time she will need to finish τj , but she does know
a duration distribution.
Studies on various task allocation problems assume pri-
vate information of the players, regarding either probability
of success (Porter et al. 2008; Zhao, Ramchurn, and Jen-
nings 2016) or task duration (Stein et al. 2011; Conitzer and
Vidali 2014). Similarly, in our coalitional game the execu-
tion time distribution is i’s private information to determine
the characteristic function. Let the discrete random variable
Ei denote the execution time of player i on task τj . We use
ei ∈ {1, 2, · · · } to denote a realization of Ei. Let fi be the
probability mass function of Ei, i.e., Pr[Ei = ei] = fi(ei).
There might be a cost ci for i to execute task τj . We assume
the cost is public and it can be ignored for the current analy-
sis.
The goal of the above coalitional game is to find the opti-
mal task allocation (one task can only be allocated to at most
one player) such that the tasks T can be finished before dead-
line d with the highest probability. This would generate the
highest expected value/reward for the players. That is, the
characteristic function v : 2N → R can be defined by
v(S) equals the highest probability that a group of play-
ers S ⊆ N can finish all the tasks T before d.
It is evident that the definition of v satisfies v(∅) = 0 and
the monotonicity property, i.e., v(S) ≤ v(T ) ≤ 1 for all
S ⊆ T ⊆ N . v(S)×V is the expected value the coalition S
can cooperate to achieve.
Since duration distributions are private and v(S) is not
publicly known, we cannot easily achieve the goal and share
the reward among the players with the standard techniques
for coalitional games. The challenge here is that players can
manipulate the game by misreporting their time distribu-
tions, which is not available in classical coalitional games.
The goal of this paper is to design new reward sharing
mechanisms for the above game such that players are incen-
tivized to report their time distributions truthfully.
The reward sharing mechanism requires each player to
report her execution time distribution, but the player may
not necessarily report her true distribution. For each player
i ∈ N , let fi be the density function of her true distribu-
tion, and f ′i be her report. Let f = (f1, · · · , fn) be the true
density function profile of all players and f ′ = (f ′1, · · · , f ′n)
be their report profile. We also denote f by (fi, f−i) and f ′
by (f ′i , f
′
−i). Let Fi be the density function space of fi andF = (F1, · · · ,Fn) be the space of density function profile
f .
Definition 1. A reward sharing mechanism is defined by
x = (xi)i∈N , where xi : F → R defines the reward player
i receives given all players’ report profile.
To incentivize players to report their private information
truthfully, a concept called incentive compatible has been
defined in the literature of mechanism design. We apply the
same concept here to define the incentives to report their
time distributions truthfully. We say a reward sharing mech-
anism is incentive compatible if for each player reporting
her time distribution truthfully is a dominant strategy.
Definition 2. A reward sharing mechanism x is incentive
compatible if for all players i ∈ N , for all f ∈ F , for all
f ′ ∈ Fi, we have xi(f) ≥ xi(f ′i , f−i).
In the rest of the paper, we study incentive compatible
reward sharing mechanisms.
The Failure of the Shapley Value
Shapley value is a well-known solution concept in coop-
erative game theory (Shapley 1953). It divides the reward
among the players in a coalition according to their marginal
contributions. It has many desirable properties such as effi-
ciency (the reward is fully distributed to the players), sym-
metry (equal players receive equal rewards) and null player
(dummy players receive no reward).
If we simply apply the Shapley value in our setting, the
reward for each player is defined as:
xshai (f
′) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)) (1)
where v(S ∪ {i}) and v(S) are defined under the players’
report profile f ′.
The Shapley value of a player i is the average marginal
contribution among all permutations of the players. In each
permutation, player i’s marginal contribution is v(S∪{i})−
v(S), where S is the set of all players before i in the permu-
tation.
In this paper, we assume that in the grand coalition, for
each task group, the player who is assigned the task has the
highest Shapley value among the same task group. This in-
duces some conditions on the time distributions, which is
not clear what the exact conditions are. Intuitively, it implies
if a player is better than the others in the same task group in
the grand coalition, then it should also be better than them
in sub-coalitions.
Let us consider a simple example:
Example 1. There are two tasks T = (τ1, τ2) to
be finished before deadline 2 and four players N =
{1, 2, 3, 4} with Nτ1 = {1, 2} and Nτ2 = {3, 4}. Their
execution time density functions are:
f1(e) = f3(e) =

3/4 if e = 1
1/4 if e = 3
0 otherwise
(2)
f2(e) = f4(e) =

1/4 if e = 1
3/4 if e = 2
0 otherwise
(3)
If all players report their density functions truthfully,
then the allocation to maximize the probability to finish
both τ1 and τ2 is to assign τ1 to player 1 and τ2 to
player 3. The probability is 9/16, i.e., v(N) = 9/16.
The characteristic function in Example 1 is defined as:
v({1, 3}) = v({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 3, 4}) = v({1, 2, 3, 4}) =
9/16, v({1, 4}) = v({1, 2, 4}) = 3/16, v({2, 3}) =
v({2, 3, 4}) = 3/16, v({2, 4}) = 1/16, and the value for
the rest coalitions is zero.
To compute the Shapley value for player 1, we list out
all the permutations of the players and check player 1’s
marginal contribution in each permutation in the following
table. The average marginal contribution of player 1 among
all permutations is 47/192 ≈ 0.2448.
order # permut. S v(S ∪ {1})− v(S)
(1,{2,3,4}) 6 {} 0
(2,1,{3,4}) 2 {2} 0
(3,1,{2,4}) 2 {3} 9/16
(4,1,{2,3}) 2 {4} 3/16
({3,4},1,2) 2 {3,4} 9/16
({2,4},1,3) 2 {2,4} 2/16
({2,3},1,4) 2 {2,3} 6/16
({2,3,4},1) 6 {2,3,4} 6/16
Similarly, we get the Shapley value for all players:
player xshai (f)
1 47/192
2 7/192
3 47/192
4 7/192
Question 1. In Example 1, only players 1 and 3 actually
perform the tasks, so can we reward only players 1 and 3
according to their Shapley value?
The answer is no. For example, player 2 could misreport a
density function f ′2 such that v({2, 3}) > v({1, 3}), in order
to be selected for τ1 and receive a non-zero Shapley value.
Therefore, we cannot exclude rewards to players who have
not been assigned a task in the reward sharing mechanism.
Question 2. In Example 1, can any of the players misreport
to gain a higher Shapley value?
The answer is yes. For instance, player 1 can misreport f ′1
such that
f ′1(e) =
{
1 if e = 1
0 otherwise
(4)
If the other players still report truthfully, player 1’s Shapley
value under this misreport is 67/192, which is larger than
the value 47/192 under report f1. This kind of misreport
applies to all players. The reason is that their Shapley value
only depends on what they have reported, not what they can
actually do.
In next section, we show how to modify the Shapley value
to link it to the players’ true time distributions.
Truthful Shapley Value
As evident from Question 2, players can report a more
promising execution time distribution to receive a higher
Shapley value. This is because the Shapley value mecha-
nism never verifies their reports. In reality, we could actually
observe how much time a player has spent to accomplish
her task. Therefore, we can pay them according to their ex-
ecution outcomes. A similar approach has been applied in
other task allocation settings by using auctions, especially
VCG mechanism (Porter et al. 2008; Ramchurn et al. 2009;
Conitzer and Vidali 2014; Stein et al. 2011; Zhao, Ram-
churn, and Jennings 2016).
Definition 3. Given all players’ execution time distribution
report profile f ′ = (f ′1, · · · , f ′n), for each coalition S ⊆ N ,
pif
′
S : T → N ∪ {⊥} is the task assignment to define v(S).
pif
′
S (τj) =⊥ means that τj has not been assigned to any
player under coalition S with reports f ′.
Next are some specific notations for the new mechanism.
• Let v(S, f ′) be the highest probability to finish all the
tasks before the deadline under the report profile f ′.
• Let v(pif ′S , f ′′) be the probability to finish all the tasks be-
fore the deadline given that the optimal task assignment
is defined by pif
′
S but the actual probability to finish the
tasks is calculated by f ′′. That is, v(pif
′
S , f
′′) uses f ′ to
determine the optimal task assignment under coalition S,
but uses f ′′ to recalculate the probability without chang-
ing the task assignment. In the mechanism, f ′ represents
their reports and f ′′ represents what we observed.
Shapley Value with Execution Verification (SEV)
Given all players’ report profile f ′,
• for each player i who has been assigned a task un-
der pif
′
N , if her realised execution time is ei, then her
Shapley value is updated as:
xsevi (f
′, ei) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
(v(pif
′
S∪{i}, (f
ei
i , f
′
−i))− v(S, f ′))
(5)
where feii represents the realization ei and is defined
as:
feii (e) =
{
1 if e = ei
0 otherwise
• for each player j who has not been assigned any task
in the assignment pif
′
N , her Shapley value stays the
same (as we cannot observe j’s execution time):
xsevj (f
′) =
∑
S⊆N\{j}
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
(v(S ∪ {j}, f ′)− v(S, f ′)) (6)
Theorem 1. The SEV mechanism is incentive compatible
for all players who are assigned a task, but it is not incentive
compatible for players who are not assigned a task.
Proof. For each player i who has been assigned a
task, i’s reward varies according her execution out-
comes, but her expected reward is E[xsevi (f
′, ei)] =∑
ei∈Ei fi(ei)x
sev
i (f
′, ei). If i reports her true distribu-
tion, i.e., f ′i = fi, E[x
sev
i (f
′, ei)] equals her Shapley
value xshai (f
′). Now if f ′i 6= fi, can i receive a larger
E[xsevi (f
′, ei)]?
No matter what i reports, i is either assigned or not as-
signed the task. If i is assigned the task when i reports fi,
then we show that her expected reward is maximized when
i reports fi. For the expected reward, we could look the ex-
pected reward (marginal contribution) in each player permu-
tation. For each permutation, assume S ⊂ N is the set of
players before i:
• if i has a non-zero marginal contribution, i.e., v(S∪{i})−
v(S) > 0, it means that i is assigned the task in the
coalition S∪{i}. Then i’s expected marginal contribution
would be
∑
ei∈Ei fi(ei)(v(S ∪ {i}, ei) − v(S)), where
v(S ∪ {i}, ei) is the probability to finish all the tasks
when i’s execution time is fixed to ei without changing
the task assignment defined by pif
′
S∪{i}. If i reports fi, then∑
ei∈Ei fi(ei)v(S ∪ {i}, ei) = v(S ∪ {i}). If i reports
f ′i which dominates fi, then i is still assigned the task,
but
∑
ei∈Ei fi(ei)v(S ∪ {i}, ei) stays the same (although
in this case v(S ∪ {i}) might be increased). If i reports
f ′i such that i is not assigned the task under the coali-
tion S∪{i}, then i’s marginal contribution becomes zero.
Therefore, reporting fi truthfully maximizes i’s expected
marginal contribution in this permutation.
• if i has a zero marginal contribution, i.e., v(S ∪ {i}) =
v(S), it means that i is not assigned the task in the coali-
tion S ∪ {i}. Thus, i’s expected marginal contribution in
this case is zero. If i reports f ′i such that i is assigned the
task under the coalition S ∪ {i}, then the expected prob-
ability
∑
ei∈Ei fi(ei)v(S ∪ {i}, ei) would be less than
v(S ∪ {i}). This is because i takes a task from another
player and makes the allocation non-optimal. Therefore,
i’s expected marginal contribution in this case is negative.
Hence, reporting fi also maximizes i’s expected marginal
contribution in this case.
Since the expected marginal contribution in each permuta-
tion is maximized when i reports truthfully, then her total
expected reward is also maximized in this case.
For each player j who is not assigned a task, we can eas-
ily find a counter example where j can misreport to gain a
higher reward. We can always find a setting and a permuta-
tion where j’s marginal contribution is zero. For this permu-
tation, we can change j’s distribution such that j’s marginal
contribution is greater than zero, but j is still not assigned a
task in the grand coalition N . By doing so, the mechanism
cannot observe j’s execution outcome and simply pays her
the standard Shapley value which is greater than what she
could have when she reports fj truthfully.
As seen in Theorem 1, players who were not assigned a
task can misreport to gain a higher reward under the SEV
mechanism, because there is a lack of verification on their
reports. It is certainly not ideal to assign each task to all its
players to try, which is also not practical. Instead, we do the
manipulation on behalf of the players to maximize their re-
wards they could gain. For each player who is not assigned
the task, we treat this player as good as the player who is
assigned the task to calculate her new Shapley value as her
reward. This reward is the best the player could get by misre-
porting, and therefore, there is not incentive for misreporting
anymore. The updated mechanism is defined as follows.
Shapley Value with Execution Verification and
Bonus (SEVB)
Given all players’ report profile f ′,
• for each player i who is assigned a task under pif ′N ,
if her realised execution time is ei, then her Shapley
value is defined as the same as in SEV (Equation (5)),
i.e., xsevbi (f
′, ei) = xsevi (f
′, ei).
• for each player j (assume j ∈ Nτi ) who is not as-
signed the task τi in pi
f ′
N , her Shapley value is up-
graded as xsevbj (f
′) =
∑
S⊆N\{j}
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
(v(S ∪ {j}, (f∗j , f ′−j))− v(S, (f∗j , f ′−j))) (7)
where f∗j = f
′
i∗ and i
∗ = pif
′
N (τi), i.e., i
∗ is the player
who is assigned τi.
Theorem 2. The SEVB mechanism is incentive compatible.
Proof. For each player i who is assigned a task, as proved in
Theorem 1, there is no incentive to misreport when the play-
ers who are not assigned a task are paid according to Equa-
tion 6. Now the unassigned players’ reward has upgraded
to Equation 7, we need to prove that it is not better for i to
misreport such that i is not assigned the task in the grand
coalition.
Assume that i is assigned task τi, if i misreports f ′i such
that τi is assigned to j, then i’s reward will the upgraded
Shapley value when we treat i’s report as identical as j’s
report. Initially, we know that j’s report is not better than
i’s (otherwise, i would not be assigned). Now i’s misreport
f ′i is not as good as j’s. We can prove that i’s reward under
f ′i is not better than under fi. This can be proved from each
single permutation.
• If i has a non-zero marginal contribution in a permutation
when i reports truthfully (assume S are the players before
i), when i reports f ′i , i is either assigned or not assigned
the task. If i is still assigned the task, then her marginal
contribution is calculated as when treat i as j, which is
clearly not better than i reports truthfully. If i is not as-
signed the task, then her marginal contribution becomes
zero, which is again worse than reporting truthfully.
• If i has zero marginal contribution in a permutation when
i reports truthfully, then the contribution stays the same if
she reports f ′i .
In summary, we get that player i’s reward is not increased
when she misreports f ′i .
For player j who is not assigned a task, assume j belongs
to task group τi and i is assigned τi when j reports fj :
• if j misreports f ′j such that f ′j is not dominating i’s report
f ′i , then j is still not assigned task τi and still receives the
same reward.
• if f ′j dominates f ′i , then j will be assigned τi. We will
prove that j’s expected reward under this case is not better
than reporting fj .
When f ′j dominates f
′
i , j is assigned τj in the grand coali-
tion and will execute task τi. For each permutation where j’s
marginal contribution is non-zero under f ′j , then under fj ,
j’s marginal contribution can be either zero or non-zero. If it
is zero, then her expected reward in this permutation will be
negative, because j is forced to change the optimal alloca-
tion, but could not increase the value. If it is non-zero, then
her expected reward stays the same, as the reward is calcu-
lated according to her execution outcomes (her true fj).
Together, we proved that j cannot receive a better reward
by misreporting.
Since the SEVB mechanism may pay more than their ac-
tual Shapley values for players who did not receive a task,
the total payment together might be greater than the total re-
ward the grand coalition can gain. Theorem 3 shows that the
extra payment is bounded.
Theorem 3. Given any execution time distribution report
profile f , the total reward distributed under the SEVB mech-
anism is bounded by (1 +
∑k
i=1
i!(m− 1)!
(m+ i)!
(n −m − k +
1))v(N, f), where integer k ≥ 1 is a parameter to maximize
the bound given n and m.
To prove Theorem 3, we first need to show some key prop-
erties of the Shapley value in our setting.
Lemma 1. Given that there are m players each of whom
can do one of the m tasks and together can finish the tasks
before the deadline with a probability p, assume that player
i is assigned τi. Also consider that we add one more player
(1) ... j ... i0 i  
m  1
(2) ... j...i0 i  
(3) ... j p
m
m + 1 insertions
(4) ji0 p... ...
m + 1
1
Figure 1: For proof of Lemma 1
i′ for task τi, such that i′ will not be assigned task τi when
them+1 players collaborate together. If player i′’s Shapley
value in the grand coalition is , then the Shapley value for
i is
p
m
−m and the Shapley value for the other players is
p
m
+ . Also, the total reward distributed under the SEVB
mechanism for the m + 1 players is maximized when i′ is a
dummy player, i.e.,  = 0.
Proof. Under the computation of the Shapley value, for each
permutation of them+1 players, if player i′’s marginal con-
tribution is δ > 0, then player imust be the last player and i′
is the second last player in the permutation (otherwise, i′’s
marginal contribution is zero, see Figure 1 permutation (1)).
If we simply switch player i′ with any player j before i′, un-
der this new permutation, j’s marginal contribution is also δ
(Figure 1 permutation (2)). Clearly, if we change the order
of all players before i′, we get (m − 1)! different permuta-
tions and in each permutation i′’s marginal contribution is
also δ. Similarly for player j, we also get (m− 1)! different
permutations where j’s marginal contribution is δ.
Before the addition of player i′, for each permutation of
the m players, only the last player has a marginal contribu-
tion p. Therefore, for each player j, we have (m − 1)! dif-
ferent permutations where j is the last player with marginal
contribution p. We have in total m! permutations, hence j’s
Shapley value is
p
m
.
After adding player i′, for each original permutation of
the m players, we can insert i′ in-between the m players.
We have m + 1 possible insertions for i′, where each such
insertion creates a new permutation, in which the marginal
contribution of the last player j 6= i (last according the origi-
nal permutation) remains p among all them+1 new permu-
tations (Figure 1 permutations (3) and (4)). The addition of
a player increases the total number of permutations from m!
to (m+1)!, however, the number of permutations where the
marginal contribution of each player j 6= i is p also increases
from (m−1)! to (m+1)(m−1)!. Therefore, the Shapley val-
ues of all players except i (withm players) are transferred to
the setting of m+ 1 players. In addition, as depicted in Fig-
ure 1 permutations (1) and (2), player j 6= i also receives
whatever player i′ has in terms of Shapley value. Thus, if
player i′’s Shapley value is , then the same value is also
added to player j’s Shapley value. Hence, the new Shapley
value for player j 6= i is p
m
+ . Since the sum of all the
players’ Shapley value is p, we get that player i’s Shapley
value is
p
m
−m.
Under the SEVB mechanism, all players except i′ receive
a reward equal to their Shapley value. For player i′, her re-
ward under SEVB is
p
(m+ 1)m
. This is computed by as-
suming that i′ has the same distribution as i. Since i and i′
are identical, their Shapley value is the same. Now for each
permutation, i’s marginal contribution is p if and only if i′ is
the last and i is the second last in the permutation. Thus, the
total number of permutations where i’s marginal contribu-
tion is p is (m−1)!, leading to a Shapley value of p
(m+ 1)m
for players i and i′. Hence, the total reward distributed under
SEVB is
(
p
m
−m) + ( p
m
+ )(m− 1) + p
(m+ 1)m
.
To simplify it, we get (1 +
1
(m+ 1)m
)p− , which is max-
imized when  = 0.
Lemma 2. Given n ≥ m + 1 players for m tasks, assume
that there are n− (m−1) players for task τi and one player
for each of the other m− 1 tasks and the n players together
can finish the m tasks before the deadline with probability
p where τi is allocated to player i. Then the total reward
distributed under the SEVB mechanism is maximized when
all players j 6= i for τi are dummy players, i.e., their Shapley
value under the grand coalition is zero.
Lemma 3. Given n ≥ m + 1 players for m tasks, assume
that there are k ≥ 1 identical players for task τj , n − k −
(m − 2) players for task τi 6= τj (where all players except
for one of them are dummy players), one player for each of
the other m − 2 tasks and the n players together can finish
the m tasks before the deadline with a probability p. Then
the total reward distributed under the SEVB mechanism is
(1 +
∑k
i=1
i!(m− 1)!
(m+ i)!
(n−m− k + 1))p.
The proofs of Lemma 2 and 3 are given in the appendix.
Proof of Theorem 3. From Lemma 2, we know that when
there is only one player for each task except for one task,
then the worst case happens when n−m players are dummy
players for one task. The total reward distributed in this case
is (1 +
n−m
m(m+ 1)
)v(N, f) (set k = 1 in Lemma 3). How-
ever, this is not necessarily the worst case in general. It is ev-
ident that if we simply move a dummy player from one task
group to another task group, it will not change the dummy
player’s reward under the SEVB mechanism (it is always
1
(m+ 1)m
v(N, f)).
Interestingly, if we move a dummy player to another task
group and make it non-dummy, it may increase the total
reward distributed under the SEVB mechanism. Assume
that initially all dummy players are for task τi. Now if we
move a dummy i∗ from τi to τj 6= τi. To make i∗ non-
dummy, assume that the Shapley value for i∗ is  > 0
(but it does not dominate the original player for τj , oth-
erwise, v(N, f) will be increased and make the two set-
tings not comparable). Hence, the total reward for the non-
dummy players has reduced by  due to the change of i∗
(property of the Shapley value). The reward for i∗ stays the
same as
1
(m+ 1)m
v(N, f). The key difference is the re-
ward of the other dummy players for τi. Following the proof
of Lemma 3, the new Shapley value for the other dummy
players becomes
1
(m+ 1)m
v(N, f) +
2
m+ 2
, which has
been increased by
2
m+ 2
. Thus, the total reward increase
after moving i∗ is
−+ 2
m+ 2
(n−m− 1) =
2n− 3m− 4
m+ 2

(8)
If
2n− 3m− 4
m+ 2
 > 0, then the difference is maximised
when  is maximised, which happens when i∗ is identical
to the original player for τj . Therefore, if moving a dummy
player from τi to another task group increases the total re-
ward, then the worst case happens when the dummy player
is identical to the best player in the new group.
If we keep moving dummy players from τi to other
groups, if this increases the total reward, then we can again
prove that the worst case exists when the dummy player is
identical to the best player in the new group. Moreover, fol-
lowing the analysis of Lemma 3, we can also prove that the
reward stays the same even if the dummy players moved out
from τi’s group are not going to the same task group. Thus,
we can keep moving dummy players to the same task τj to
check if it increases the reward and stop when it does not in-
crease the reward. When this stops, we reach the worst case
setting, which is the setting given by Lemma 3.
The VCG with Verification
Our coalitional game setting can be also treated as an auction
setting and apply standard auction mechanisms. This section
shows that VCG can be adopted with execution verification
to satisfy incentive compatibility in our setting.
VCG with Execution Verification (VCGEV)
Given all players’ report profile f ′, for each player i,
• if i is assigned a task under under pif ′N , and her re-
alised execution time is ei, i’s reward is defined as:
xvcgevi (f
′, ei) = v(pi
f ′
N , (f
ei
i , f
′
−i))− v(N \ {i}, f ′−i) (9)
where feii represents ei for i and is defined as:
feii (e) =
{
1 if e = ei
0 otherwise
• otherwise, i’s reward is xvcgevi (f ′) = 0.
VCG is often applied in a non-cooperative setting, so the
reward for each player is her marginal contribution given
that all the other players are already in the coalition. A
player’s reward equals the marginal contribution in one per-
mutation where the player is the last one joining the group.
Therefore, if in the same task group, two good players are
identical, then neither of them will be rewarded. On the other
hand, if only one player can handle each task and the oth-
ers are not capable, then each player who is assigned a task
would get paid v(N). Therefore, the reward distribution un-
der VCG does not consider players’ contributions in a more
thoughtful manner as the Shapley value does. Nonetheless,
the VCG based mechanism is incentive compatible.
Theorem 4. The VCGEV mechanism is incentive compati-
ble.
Proof. If a player i is assigned a task, then her expected
reward is E[xvcgevi (f
′, ei)] =
∑
ei∈Ei fi(ei)x
vcgev
i (f
′, ei).
v(N \ {i}, f ′−i) is the probability to finish all the
tasks without i’s participation, which is indepen-
dent of i. The expectation of v(pif
′
N , (f
ei
i , f
′
−i))
is
∑
ei∈Ei fi(ei)v(pi
f ′
N , (f
ei
i , f
′
−i)), which equals
v(N, (fi, f
′
−i)) if i reports fi truthfully. It is evident
that v(N, (fi, f ′−i)) ≥ v(N \ {i}, f ′−i), i’s reward is
non-negative when reporting truthfully.
Suppose that when i misreports f ′i 6= fi, we have∑
ei∈Ei fi(ei)v(pi
f ′
N , (f
ei
i , f
′
−i)) > v(N, (fi, f
′
−i)). Since∑
ei∈Ei fi(ei)v(pi
f ′
N , (f
ei
i , f
′
−i)) uses i’s true execution out-
come to calculate the reward, the only thing that f ′i influ-
ences is the task assignment pif
′
N . If indeed assignment pi
f ′
N
gives a higher expected probability to finish all the tasks,
then the definition of v(N, (fi, f ′−i)) should have chosen
this assignment. However, we know v(N, (fi, f ′−i)) is op-
timal, which is a contradiction.
If a player j is not assigned a task, then her marginal
contribution is zero. If she misreports to be assigned a task,
her expected reward becomes negative (following the above
analysis).
Theorem 5. Given any execution time distribution report
profile f , the total reward distributed under the VCGEV
mechanism can be as small as zero and as large as m ×
v(N, f).
Proof. For each player who is assigned a task, if there
is another identical player in the same task group, then
the player’s reward under the VCGEV mechanism is zero.
Therefore, in the worst case, all players receive zero reward.
In the other extreme case, where there is only one player
for each task, then the reward for each player is v(N, f),
which is the maximal reward a player can get in any setting.
Hence, the maximal total reward under the mechanism is
m× v(N, f).
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Figure 2: Experimental results for SEVB and VCGEV
It is worth mentioning that there is another simple mech-
anism, which is also truthful and the total distributed reward
is exactly what they have generated. The mechanism simply
shares the reward equally among all players after they have
executed the whole project. More specifically, each player
receives V/n if they finished the project before the deadline,
otherwise receives zero. It is easy to prove that the mech-
anism is IC. However, the weakness is that it does not pay
them according to their marginal contributions/capabilities.
Experiments
We evaluate the proposed mechanisms on many instances
that differ in the task allocation settings, completion-time
distributions, and the deadlines. We generate random distri-
butions with support size s, which is given as an input, such
that the completion times for each player are in the range of
[1. . . s] with uniform distribution.
Here we present the results for settings with 2, 3 and 4
tasks, and with different number of players. In theory, we
have seen that the total reward bound under the SEVB mech-
anism is a kind of linear function of the number of play-
ers n, whereas the higher bound of the VCGEV mechanism
is independent of n. In the experiments of 4 tasks with 4
players for each task group, Figure 2a shows the total dis-
tributed reward in proportion of v(N, f) for 20 random in-
stances. The results show that VCGEV varies a lot between
settings, while SEVB is fairly stable. As in theory, the bound
of SEVB is increasing as n increases. We tested it on 2 task
settings with the number of players for each task varying
from 2 to 8. The results in Figure 2b show that for 10 random
instances the average proportion over v(N, f) is actually de-
creasing as n increases (because more players for the same
task reduce their Shapley value). A similar trend holds for
the VCGEV mechanism (Figure 2c). We also examine set-
tings with varying number of players for the different tasks.
Figure 2d shows the percentage over v(N, f) on SEVB for
3 tasks with [3, 3, 3], [4, 3, 2] and [5, 3, 1] player settings on
50 instances. It indicates that when the players are more im-
balanced between tasks, the total reward is reduced.
Conclusion
We have studied a task allocation setting which merges in-
formation revelation challenge in mechanism design and the
payoff distribution challenge in cooperative game theory.
The two challenges cannot be solved by using existing tech-
niques from just one of the two fields. We proposed the
very fist attempt to solve the two challenges together. The
solution guarantees that players will truthfully reveal their
private information and the rewards they receive from the
coalition are fairly distributed. The cost to achieve this is
that we might need to distribute more rewards to the play-
ers than what they can achieve. However, the extra reward is
bounded and the experiments showed that the extra reward
is diminishing when more players are involved. We have not
investigated the other solution concepts such as core in the
current analysis (Aumann and Hart 1992).
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. From Lemma 1, we know that when
n = m + 1, this lemma holds. Now if n = m + 2, we
need to add one more player for task τi. Let us call the three
players for τi i, id1 and id2 and i is the player assigned task
τi and id1 is a dummy player and id2 is the newly added
player. Since id1 is a dummy player, its Shapley value is
zero. If the Shapley value for id2 is , then following the
proof of Lemma 1, we get that the Shapley value for all
players j 6∈ {i, id1, id2} is p
m
+  and the Shapley value
for i is
p
m
− m, which are also their reward distributed
under the SEVB mechanism. The reward for id2 under the
SEVB mechanism is
p
(m+ 1)m
, but the reward for id1 is
p
(m+ 1)m
− δ (because id2 creates competition for id1,
which decreases id1’s reward). Therefore, the total reward
distributed under the SEVB mechanism is
(
p
m
−m) + ( p
m
+ )(m− 1) + 2 p
(m+ 1)m
− δ,
which is (1+
2
(m+ 1)m
)p− −δ. This is maximised when
 = δ = 0. Following this, we can prove that for any n ≥
m+ 1, the lemma holds.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let k players for τj be {j1, · · · , jk} and
the non-dummy player for τi be i. Let us compute the Shap-
ley value for the player l for task τl ∈ T \ {τi, τj}.
If k = 1, we have m non-dummy players (one for each
task), then marginal contribution for l is p only when l is
ordered in the last among the m non-dummy players in a
permutation (see Figure 3a permutation type (1), dummy
players can be placed anywhere in the permutation). Hence,
l’s Shapley value is
p
m
.
If k = 2, for the permutation type (1), we can insert j2
anywhere in the permutation without changing l’s marginal
contribution. In addition, adding player j2 will increase l’s
marginal contribution for the permutation where l is not or-
dered in the last (see Figure 3a permutation type (2), where
j1 is ordered in the last). Without j2, l’s marginal contribu-
tion under permutation type (2) is zero. Because of j2, l’s
marginal contribution becomes p. Therefore, when k = 2,
the new Shapley for l is
p
m
+
p
(m+ 1)m
.
If k = 3, for the permutation types (1) and (2), we insert
j3 anywhere without changing l’s marginal contribution, so
the Shapley value under k = 2 stays for k = 3. In addition,
adding j3 increases l’s marginal contribution from zero to
p for the permutation where l is ordered before j1 and j2
(see Figure 3a permutation type (3)). If we ignore all the
dummy players, among all the (m+ 2)! permutations, there
(m−1)!×2 type (3) permutations. Hence, l’s Shapley value
is increased by
p
(m+ 2)(m+ 1)m
by adding j3.
Following the above analysis, for any k, we get the Shap-
ley value for l is
p
m
+
p
(m+ 1)m
+ · · ·+ (k − 1)!p
(m+ k − 1)(m+ k − 2) · · ·m =
k∑
i=1
(i− 1)!(m− 1)!
(m+ i− 1)! p
(10)
This is also the Shapley value for player i.
Let us compute the Shapley value for players
{j1, · · · , jk}. Following Figure 3b, if k = 1, then j’s
marginal contribution is p as long as j1 is the last player
among the m non-dummy players (see Figure 3b permuta-
tion type (1)). If we ignore the dummy players, then there
are m! total permutations, among them (m − 1)! permuta-
tions have j1 in the last. Therefore, j1’s Shapley value is
p
m
when k = 1. Now if k = 2, among all the (m − 1)!
original permutations, we have to insert another player j2
inside each permutation. Among all the insertions, only if
we insert j2 after j1, j1’s marginal contribution will stay the
same (see Figure 3b permutation type (2)). Therefore, j1’s
Shapley value is reduced to
p
(m+ 1)m
. Keep doing this
until we add the last player jk (see Figure 3b permutation
type (k)), we get the reduced Shapley value for each j1 as
(which is the same for all j ∈ {j1, · · · , jk})
(k − 1)!(m− 1)!
(m+ k − 1)! p (11)
For each dummy player i∗ for τi, we compute the reward
for i∗ under the SEVB mechanism as its Shapley value when
i∗ is identical to i. Following Figure 3c, if k = 1, then i∗ has
marginal contribution p only if i is the last player and i∗ is
the second last player in a permutation (see Figure 3c permu-
tation type (1)). If we ignore the other dummy players, there
are (m + 1)! total permutations and only (m − 1)! of them
have i in the last and i∗ in the second last position. Thus, i∗’s
Shapley value is
p
(m+ 1)m
when k = 1. Now if we add an-
other player j2, firstly, it will not affect all the permutation
of type (1), in addition, for some permutations where i∗ has
zero contribute before may have a positive contribution now.
These are the permutations where the last three players are
either (i∗, j1, i) or (i∗, i, j1) (see Figure 3c permutation type
(2)). Before insert j2, we have (m−2)!2 such permutations,
where i∗’s contribution is zero. If we add j2 before i∗, i∗’s
contribution becomes p, which in average will give i∗ an ex-
tra reward
2p
(m+ 2)(m+ 1)m
. Following this procedure to
add all k players, we get the total new Shapley value for i∗
as
k∑
i=1
i!(m− 1)!
(m+ i)!
p (12)
To sum up, the total reward distributed under the SEVB
mechanism is the sum of (m − 1) times of (10), k times of
(11), and (n −m − k + 1) times of (12). It is evident that
the sum of (m − 1) times of (10) and k times of (11) is p
because it is the total Shapley value under the ground coali-
tion. Hence, the total reward is (1 +
∑k
i=1
i!(m− 1)!
(m+ i)!
(n −
m− k + 1))p.
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